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A new commitment scheme based on position-verification and non-local quantum correlations is 
presented here for the first time in literature. The only credential for unconditional security is the position 
of committer and non-local correlations generated; neither receiver has any pre-shared data with the 
committer nor does receiver require trusted and authenticated quantum/classical channels between him 
and the committer. In the proposed scheme, receiver trusts the commitment only if the scheme itself 
verifies position of the committer and validates her commitment through non-local quantum correlations 
in a single round. The position-based commitment scheme bounds committer to reveal valid commitment 
within allocated time and guarantees that the receiver will not be able to get information about 
commitment unless committer reveals. The scheme works for the commitment of both bits and qubits and 
is equally secure against committer/receiver as well as against any third party who may have interests in 
destroying the commitment. Our proposed scheme is unconditionally secure in general and evades 
Mayers and Lo-Chau attacks in particular.  
 
1. Introduction 
A bit commitment scheme involves two mistrustful parties, committer and a receiver, conventionally 
called Alice and Bob. Alice provides a piece of evidence to Bob that commit her to a specific bit b. At 
this stage, Bob should not be able to extract the bit value from that evidence. At a later time, however, it 
must be possible for Bob to know the genuine bit value b with absolute guarantee when Alice reveals the 
committed bit and Alice should not be able to change her mind about the value of the bit b.   
Bit commitment is an essential cryptographic protocol for implementing a wide range of other 
functions. From a trusted bit commitment scheme one can construct coin tossing1, digital signature2, 
oblivious transfer3, and hence two-party secure computation4.  But, unfortunately, all classical bit 
commitment schemes based on unproven computational hardness cannot be secure in principle.  
Many authors attempted to achieve information-theoretically secure bit commitment in non-
relativistic quantum cryptographic settings5-7. Currently, however, it is known that all bit commitment 
schemes based on non-relativistic quantum information cannot evade Mayers and Lo-Chau attacks8-11 if 
Alice and Bob do not pre-share any data. Mayers showed that bit commitment protocols that make use of 
the theory of special relativity are also insecure8. Later on, A. Kent proposed relativist classical bit 
commitment protocols12,13 and showed that security against all classical attacks as well as quantum attacks 
introduced by Mayers and Lo-Chau is guaranteed by impossibility of superluminal signaling. However, 
he has not given any proof of unconditional security of these protocols against general attacks. A. Kent 
also proposed a general framework for relativistic cryptographic protocols where he considered that the 
background space time is approximately Minkowski and communicating agencies have distributed agents 
throughout the space time. If a sender sends a state from point (x,0) by performing instantaneous 
computation on it then after some fixed time t > 0, the light-like separated agents from the sender in some 
given inertial frame can receive the state on a special sphere of radius t and centered at x. The assumption 
of instantaneous computations in a fixed inertial frame breaks the Lorentz invariance which is necessary 
for practical cryptographic tasks.    
 Recently, A. Kent addressed the same problem in relativistic quantum cryptography14,15. Both of 
his protocols are based on similar intuition and are secure against general classical and quantum 
attacks16,17. The security of these protocols depends on the no-cloning18 and no-signaling principles. 
Moreover, two different groups experimentally demonstrated the results of Kent’s protocol15, using 
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quantum communication and special relativity, with commitment times of 15ms19 and 30µs20, 
respectively.  
Here, they used the idea of disjoint sites for both Alice and Bob first introduced by Ben-Or et al21. 
In this procedure both Alice and Bob are not the individuals but they have their own trusted agents (≥ 2) 
distributed throughout the space time. Both Alice and Bob need to have secure and authenticated 
quantum/classical channels to communicate with their respective agents. Moreover, these protocols 
require that both Alice and Bob agree in advance on some space time point where the commitment will 
commence and both these parties must have disjoint laboratories near that point. The receiver Bob sends 
the encrypted quantum states to the committer Alice at that point and then Alice sends these quantum 
states (or measurement results) after processing to her space-like separated agents in causal future of that 
point. The committed bit value by Alice then depends on the direction in which she sends the information. 
To reveal the committed bit, Alice’s agent in that direction sends the information to the Bob’s agent in 
nearby laboratory.  The minimum secure laboratories required by these protocols are six: three in 
possession of Alice and her two agents while three kept by Bob and his two agents.  
In this article, we present a commitment scheme based on position-verification and non-local 
quantum correlations, different from all previously proposed schemes in literature. Position-based 
quantum cryptography22-33 has remained a conundrum for many years, but recently we proposed a 
quantum scheme for secure positioning34 that can be useful in implementing other cryptographic tasks35. 
This strategy for studying cryptography uses teleportation36 and entanglement swapping37 in an interesting 
and new fashion. 
Our procedure for position-based commitment has remarkable advantages over previously 
presented schemes. Our scheme bounds Alice to commit while she initiates the scheme instead of sending 
signals in different directions to her agents after processing data. In fact, Alice does not need any single 
agent while Bob needs only one trusted agent who helps him in position-verification of Alice. Moreover, 
Alice and Bob do not need to agree on a pre-defined position to start commitment. Instead, Alice and Bob 
can be anywhere in Minkowski space time. Alice starts the commitment scheme and Bob can only trust 
her commitment if the commitment scheme itself verifies position of Alice and validates the commitment 
through non-local quantum correlations. Moreover, our scheme is equally secure against 
committer/receiver as well as against any third party (eavesdroppers) who may have interests in 
destroying this commitment. Furthermore, our scheme works for the commitment of both bits and qubits 
and does not require any advanced technology (quantum computer) for the commitment of quantum 
superposition states ( ) 2/10 ± . Finally, our scheme is purely relativistic quantum mechanical and 
does not require any secure classical channel, different from previously proposed schemes. All the 
classical information can be communicated (or can be publically announced) after completion of quantum 
transmissions, so even insecure classical channels do not lead to cheating. 
 
2. Proposed commitment scheme 
We assume that committer Alice, receiver Bob and his agent have fixed position in Minkowski space-
time; their secure sites. Bob and his agent have précised and synchronized clocks also. We also assume 
that Bob and his agent are trusted and known to each other, they need to share maximally entangled states 
among them. They can pre-distribute these states or send entangled qubits over quantum channels 
encrypted by pre-shared classical keys. However, all the quantum/classical channels between Alice and 
Bob are insecure and they have no pre-shared quantum/classical data. In short, Alice and Bob have 
neither met before nor share any secret information and cannot trust anything happening outside their 
secure laboratories. Finally, we suppose that all quantum/classical signals can be sent at the speed of light 
while the time for information processing at the sites of Alice and Bob is negligible. For simplicity, we 
assume that Alice, Bob and his agent are collinear such that Alice is at a distance d from both Bob and his 
agent. Our scheme is described below where we denote Alice by A while Bob and his agent by B and C 
respectively and we write Bell states as: 
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∈ {0,1}and ⊕  denotes addition with mod 2.  
Commitment phase: The receiver B
 
and his agent C share randomly chosen N maximally entangled qubit 
pairs, 
ncb
N
bc uun 1=⊗=β where ncbuu are labeled Bell states. To make a commitment, A secretly 
prepares N Bell pairs 
nca
N
nac uu1=⊗=β and sends one qubit of each pair, ncu , to C through insecure 
quantum channel. A also sends a dummy quantum state d  to B simultaneously and announces her 
position. This dummy state carries no secret information but just informs B that A has made her 
commitment. Here A and B agree on a code: To commit to the bit 0, A initiates the scheme with Bell 
pairs 
n
N
nac 001=⊗=β ; to commit to the bit 1, A initiates with nNnac 011=⊗=β ; to commit to the qubit 
( ) 2/10 + , A prepares 
n
N
nac 101=⊗=β while for committing ( ) 2/10 − , A starts the scheme 
with Bell pairs 
n
N
nac 111=⊗=β .  
At time t, when C (B) receives entangled qubits (dummy state) from A, C applies randomly 
chosen unitary operators from set },,{ xzzx σσσσ on these qubits. He then performs BSM38 on qubits in 
his possession (N/2 entangled with B and N/2 with A) and gets two classical bits for each pair. Let’s label 
BSM results of C
 
as classical 2N-bit string ncc
N
ncc uu )(1 ′=′ ⊗=β . This measurement of C projects the 
qubits in possession of A and B into Bell states ss
N
ss uun ′′ =⊗= 1β  instantly, unknown to everyone at the 
moment33.  
Simultaneously, at time t, B prepares N qubits in the state
ni
N
n u1=⊗=φ  where ui ∈ {0,1}, 
applies random unitary operator Un on each qubit and teleports the state nin
N
n uU1=⊗=ψ to A. If BSM 
result of B is bbuu ′  while teleporting n
th
 qubit, then A’s half of the nth Bell’s state will become one of the 
corresponding four possible states
nin
k
x
k
zn
uUnn ′=′ σσψ . Here nk  and nk′  depend on which one of the 
four entangled state is shared between A and B at time of teleportation. For example, if they share Bell 
state 00  then bn uk =  and bn uk ′=′ . If shared state is 01 then bn uk =  and bn uk ′⊕=′ 1 . If they share 
10 then bn uk ⊕=1 and bn uk ′=′  while for 11 , bn uk ⊕=1 and bn uk ′⊕=′ 1 . Again nψ ′  is unknown to 
everyone. Since information processing time at the sites of A and B is negligibly small, so we are not 
considering it.  
Revealing phase: At the same time t, A applies further unitary operators ncna ux
u
z
)()(1 σσ ⊕ on 
n
ψ ′
 and 
immediately returns the state  
                                     
nin
k
x
k
z
u
x
u
z
N
n uUnnncna
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=
⊗=′′ σσσσψ )()(11                                       (2)
 
to B over insecure quantum channel between them. Simultaneously she reveals her commitment by telling 
values of cauu , corresponding to her initially prepared Bell pairs, to both B and C. 
Suppose both B and C receives this information at time T. C also sends time t, T, applied unitary 
operators and his BSM measurement results ncc
N
ncc uu )(1 ′=′ ⊗=β  to B. Now B can find the exact swapped 
entangled states between him and A, ss
N
ss uun ′′ =⊗= 1β , and (hence) the exact values of nk  and nk′ . He 
applies corresponding unitary transformations on ψ ′′  and gets the result. If B gets verified state 
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ni
N
n u1=⊗=φ and receives information from A within allocated time, T-t = d/c, then he is certain about 
the position of A and her commitment.  
 
3. Security analysis; N=3 
In a commitment scheme, the committer A can cheat by choosing a particular bit value b (or qubit value 
q) during the commitment phase and tell the receiver B another value during the revealing phase. A 
commitment scheme is said to be secure against A only if such a fake commitment can be discovered by 
B in the revealing phase.  
Let’s first consider a simple case for N=3 where A is honest. In the committing phase, suppose A 
starts with the state 321 010101=acβ  to commit to the bit value 1. Now if C applies randomly 
chosen operators })(,)(,){( 321 xzxz σσσσ on qubits received from A, then the entangled states shared 
between A and C will become 321 001110=′acβ , unknown to everyone now. If B and his agent C 
share randomly prepared entangled state 321 101101=bcβ  and C gets BSM results 
321 )11()10()00(=′ccβ  then swapped entangled state between A and B will be 321 011011=′ssβ , 
unknown to everyone33. Now in the revealing phase, if A announces exact Bell states 
321 010101=acβ  (her committed bit 1) and C announces his applied unitary operators and BSM 
results, then B can get exact swapped state 321 011011=′ssβ , and so the values of 
                         
)]1(][)1)][(1)(1[(]][][[ 332211 bbbbbb uuuuuukkkkkk ′′′ ⊕⊕⊕⊕=′′′                        (3) 
He then gets the verified state φ .  
Now if the committer A is not honest and tries cheating strategies introduced by Mayers and Lo-
Chau, we show here that our scheme is unconditionally secure with 100% success rate. Let’s suppose A 
changes her mind and announces 321 111111=acβ , fake commitment, and tries to convince B by 
applying random unitary operator })(,)(,){( 321 xzxz σσσσ on her retained qubits. She will do this on hit 
and trail basis as she does not know either BSM results of C and his operations on acβ or initially shared 
entangled states between B and C. Hence, entangled state swapped between A and B will become 
321 101101=′ ′ssβ . Now B receives fake commitment from A, 321 111111=acβ , while 
})(,)(,){( 321 xzxz σσσσ and 321 )11()10()00(=′ccβ  from C. He will extract Bell state shared between A 
and C as 321 100100=′′acβ and (hence) the swapped state between him and A as 
321 110001=′′ ′ssβ , that are different form 321 101101=′ ′ssβ and (hence) wrong. Finally, B will 
calculate wrong values of ]][][[ 332211 kkkkkk ′′′ , and hence wrong state φ . In conclusion, if A tries to cheat 
by applying unitary operations on retained qubit, B will always deduce wrong values of  nk  and nk′  and 
will not get initially prepared state φ and (hence) discover the cheating with 100% success. That is, B 
can only receive exact state back and accepts A’s commitment if and only if A remains fair.  
Furthermore, Alice cannot cheat successfully if she delays announcements of her initially 
prepared Bell states indefinitely and waits to get handful information for cheating. In such a situation, 
Bob will reject the commitment instantly as he will not get the response within allocated time. In 
conclusion, position-based quantum commitment based on non-local quantum correlations forces Alice to 
reveal valid commitment within time.  
Similarly, the scheme is equally secure from Bob. What do we mean by secure against Bob? In a 
commitment scheme, Bob can cheat by deducing the committed bit before the revealing phase. In our 
proposed commitment scheme, Bob can cheat only if he knows BSM results of his agent and the swapped 
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entangled states between him and A before the revealing phase. Even if he manages somehow, by non-
local measurements for example, to get BSM result from his agent, he cannot find swapped states 
between him and A. Hence, he will remain unable to get information about commitment unless Alice 
reveals.  
Furthermore, we suppose that committer and receiver are distant parties and do not have any pre-
shared data or secure quantum/classical channels between them. In such a situation, eavesdroppers can try 
to destroy the scheme even if both committer and receiver are fair. We would like to mention that our 
scheme is secure against any group of adversaries having unlimited pre-shared entangled states34. In 
conclusion, our proposed position-based commitment scheme is unconditionally secure against receiver, 
committer and any group of eavesdroppers who have infinite amount of pre-shared entanglement and 
power of non-local quantum measurements in negligible time.  
 
4. Discussion 
We presented a commitment scheme based on quantum position-verification and non-local correlations. 
Our scheme works for the commitment of both bits and qubits and it does not require any advance 
quantum computer for committing quantum superposition states (+ and -).  Remarkable feature of this 
scheme is that it does not imply any constraint on either receiver or committer. They need not fix either 
committing position or revealing time priorly but rather the scheme itself verifies these data. 
Our scheme assumes that Bob and his agent have synchronized clocks. This assumption of 
synchronization simplifies the scheme but does not give any advantages to eavesdroppers to cheat. In the 
scheme, Bob and his agent are trusted and have authenticated channels between them. Bob’s agent can 
simply send his/her position to Bob with one-time pad so distance 2d between them is known to both of 
them. Now they can synchronize their clocks by sending light signals and computing round trip times. So 
first of all, it is impossible for eavesdropper to desynchronize clocks of Bob and his agent and hence 
cannot cheat. Secondly, even under week assumption where Bob and his agent have not synchronized 
clocks, they can note the communication times with Alice independently and then compare the results that 
must be identical; T-t=T'-t'=d/c.   
We would also like to mention here that our scheme assumes fixed space time positions of Alice, 
Bob and Bob’s agent. The proposed Position-based commitment scheme adds an additional layer of 
security where position of Alice is used as her credential along with non-local quantum correlations 
between Alice and Bob. If Alice makes a commitment at position P (distance d away from both Bob and 
his agent) in the commitment phase and later tries to cheat while revealing commitment from different 
position P', it would not help her at all. She will have to respond in time d/c and within this time she 
cannot get any useful information about non-local correlations generated to cheat. 
The scheme can be generalized where receiver has multiple agents distributed in Minkowski 
space time and committer communicates with them through multi-particle entangled states over insecure 
quantum channels. It will allow the committer to commit any arbitrary quantum superposition state 
10 βαψ += also.  
Our proposed scheme can be efficiently and reliably implemented using existing quantum 
technologies and its security relies on physical principles, no-cloning and no-signaling, instead of 
computational hardness. We hope the scheme presented here will lead to further theoretical and 
experimental investigation of bit/qubit commitment. In the broader perspective, proposed commitment 
scheme can be useful to investigate other cryptographic tasks like coin tossing, digital signature and 
secure two-party computation, in a secure and robust way. In conclusion, this commitment scheme based 
on our recently proposed quantum position-verification and non-local quantum correlations will imply a 
great excitement in the area of position-based quantum cryptography. 
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